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Abstract
In this paper, the problem of synthesizing controllers that ensures non interference for multilevel security
dense timed discrete event systems modeled by an extension of Timed Automata, is addressed for the ﬁrst
time. We ﬁrst discuss a notion of non interference for dense real-time systems that reﬁnes notions existing in
the literature and investigate decidability issues raised by the veriﬁcation problem for dense time properties.
We then prove the decidability of the problem of synthesis of the timed controller for some of these timed
non interference properties, providing so a symbolic method to synthesize a controller that ensures them.
Keywords: Non-interference, control synthesis, veriﬁcation, decidability, Timed Automata.
1 Introduction
Non interference. Nowadays computing environments allow users to employ pro-
grams that are sent or fetched from diﬀerent sites to achieve their goal, either in
private or in an organization. Such programs may be run as a code to do simple
calculation task or as interactive communicating programs doing IO operations or
communications. Sometimes they deal with secret information such as a private
data of a user or as classiﬁed data of an organization. Similar situations may occur
in any computing environments where multiple users share common computing re-
sources. One of the basic concerns in such context is to ensure programs not to leak
sensitive data to a third party, either maliciously or inadvertently. This is one of the
key aspects of the security concerns, that is often called secrecy . The information
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ﬂow analysis addresses this concern by clarifying conditions when a ﬂow of infor-
mation in a program is safe (i.e. high-level information never ﬂows into low-level
channels). These conditions named non interference properties, capture any causal
dependency between high-level actions and low-level behavior. Their characteriza-
tion has appeared rapidly out of the scope of the safety-liveness classiﬁcation of
system properties achieved by the system veriﬁcation community during the last
twenty ﬁve years. Also, in recent years, veriﬁcation of information ﬂow security has
become an emergent ﬁeld of research in computer science with a success story in
its application to the analysis of cryptographic protocols where numerous uniform
and concise characterizations of information ﬂow security properties (e.g. conﬁden-
tiality, authentication, non-repudiation or anonymity) in terms of non-interference
have been proposed.
Timed non interference veriﬁcation problem. The growing importance of
veriﬁcation for real-time systems, leads naturally to the next question of whether
proof techniques developed in the untimed setting can be generalized for timed
systems in order to be able to capture, besides the logical information ﬂows, also
the time dependent interference, e.g. timing covert channel [8]. Some untimed
bisimulation-based non interference properties for information ﬂow studied in [9]
have been reformulated in [17] in a discrete time setting. In [5], some state-based
and trace-based non interference properties have been introduced in a dense time
setting using timed automata.
Timed non interference control problem. A natural generalization of security
veriﬁcation is control of security which is useful in the context of automated security
system design. The problem here is not to verify that the system meets a given
security policy, but to control the system in such a way that the security policy is
met. In this framework, a system, often called a plant, is usually viewed as open
and interacting with a “hostile” environment. The problem then is to synthesize a
controller such that no matter how the environment behaves, the controlled plan
satisﬁes the given security policy. The controller can control only a subset of actions
of the plant, referred to as the controllable actions while the non-controllable actions
represent the environment actions. In a real-time framework, the plant is modeled
using discrete or continuous clocks. Recent researches have presented symbolic
control synthesis algorithms for Timed Automata [14,2,7].
Organization of the paper and contributions. In this paper, we complete
the dense time picture for non interference started in [5] by reformulating in this
setting some untimed bisimulation-based non interference properties for informa-
tion ﬂow studied in [9] and by introducing a cosimulation-based notion of timed
non interference (section 3). Also, we investigate decidability issues raised by the
problem of their veriﬁcation as real-time requirements of ﬁnite-state systems. We
then focus (section 4) on the state-based and cosimulation-based timed non inter-
ference properties and prove the decidability of the problem of synthesis of their
timed controller. The main result of the paper is a symbolic method to synthesize a
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controller that ensures these properties. Finally, an example (section 5) is given to
illustrate this method for the cosimulation-based timed non interference property.
In the next section we give a short presentation of the notion of Timed Automata
used in this paper.
2 Timed Automata
In this section we recall the deﬁnitions of Timed Automata (section 2.2) and some
of their constructors. But ﬁrst, some preliminaries about Timed Transition Systems
and their behavior are given in section 2.1 in order to express semantics of Timed
Automata.
2.1 Timed Transition Systems
Deﬁnition 2.1 [Timed Transition Systems] A timed transition system (TTS) over
the set of actions Σ is a tuple S = (Q,Q0,Σ,−→) where Q is a set of states,
Q0 ⊆ Q is the set of initial states, Σ is a ﬁnite set of actions disjoint from R≥0,
−→⊆ Q× (Σ∪R≥0)×Q is a set of edges. We also write q
e
−−→ q′ for (q, e, q′) ∈−→.
Deﬁnition 2.2 [Timed Similation] Let S1 = (Q1, Q
1
0,Σ,−→1) and S2 =
(Q2, Q
2
0,Σ,−→2) be two TTS and  be a binary relation over Q1 × Q2. We write
s  s′ for (s, s′) ∈.  is a strong (timed) simulation relation of S1 by S2 if: 1) if
s1 ∈ Q
1
0 there is some s2 ∈ Q
2
0 s.t. s1  s2; 2) if s1
d
−→1 s
′
1 with d ∈ R≥0 and s1  s2
then s2
d
−→2 s
′
2 for some s
′
2, and s
′
1  s
′
2; 3) if s1
a
−→1 s
′
1 with a ∈ Σ and s1  s2
then s2
a
−→2 s
′
2 and s
′
1  s
′
2.
A TTS S2 strongly simulates S1 if there is a strong (timed) simulation relation of
S1 by S2. We write S1 S S2 in this case.
When there is a strong simulation relation  of S1 by S2 and also a strong
simulation ′ of S2 by S1, we have a strong (timed) cosimulation relation. When
′=−1, we have a strong (timed) bisimulation relation and we write S1 ≈S S2.
Let S = (Q,Q0,Σ
ε,−→) be a TTS. We now use the ε-abstract TTS Sε =
(Q,Qε0,Σ,−→ε) by:
• q
d
−→ε q
′ with d ≥ R≥0 iﬀ there is a run ρ = q
∗
−→ q′ with Untimed(ρ) = ε and
Duration(ρ) = d,
• q
a
−→ε q
′ with a ∈ Σ iﬀ there is a run ρ = q
∗
−→ q′ with Untimed(ρ) = a and
Duration(ρ) = 0,
• Qε0 = {q | ∃q
′ ∈ Q0 | q
′ ∗−→ q and Duration(ρ) = 0 ∧ Untimed(ρ) = ε}.
Deﬁnition 2.3 [Weak Timed Simulation] Let S1 = (Q1, Q
1
0,Σε,−→1) and S2 =
(Q2, Q
2
0, Σε,−→2) be two TTS and  be a binary relation over Q1 × Q2.  is
a weak (timed) simulation relation of S1 by S2 if it is a strong timed simulation
relation of Sε1 by S
ε
2. A TTS S2 weakly simulates S1 if there is a weak (timed)
simulation relation of S1 by S2. We write S1 W S2 in this case.
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When there is a weak simulation relation  of S1 by S2 and also a weak simula-
tion ′ of S2 by S1, we have a weak (timed) cosimulation relation. When 
′=−1,
we have a weak (timed) bisimulation relation and we write S1 ≈W S2.
Remark 2.4 Remark that if S1 S S2 then S1 W S2 and if S1 W S2 then
L(S1) ⊆ L(S2). In particular, weak timed bisimulation reﬁnes weak timed cosimu-
lation that reﬁnes timed language (or trace) equivalence.
Finally, we introduced a deﬁnition of a TTS induced by a set of states which is
informally the restriction of the TTS to a given set of states.
Deﬁnition 2.5 [TTS induced by a set of states] Let S = (Q,Q0,Σ,→) a TTS and
Y ⊆ Q. The TTS induced by Y on S is the TTS SY = (Y,Q0 ∩ Y,Σ,→i) where →i
is deﬁned by: (q, •, q′) ∈→i⇔ q ∈ Y ∧ q
′ ∈ Y ∧ (q, •, q′) ∈→
2.2 Timed Automata
Timed Automata (TA) were introduced by Alur & Dill [3] and have since been
extensively studied. This model is an extension of ﬁnite automata with (dense
time) clocks and enables one to specify real-time systems.
Deﬁnition 2.6 [Timed Automaton] A Timed Automaton A is a tuple (L, l0,
X,Σε, E, Inv) where: L is a ﬁnite set of locations; l0 ∈ L is the initial location;
X is a ﬁnite set of positive real-valued clocks; Σε = Σ∪ {ε} is a ﬁnite set of actions
and ε is the silent action; E ⊆ L × C(X) × Σε × 2X × L is a ﬁnite set of edges,
e = 〈l, γ, a,R, l′〉 ∈ E represents an edge from the location l to the location l′ with
the guard γ, the label a and the reset set R ⊆ X; Inv ∈ C(X)L assigns an invariant
to any location. We restrict the invariants to conjuncts of terms of the form x  r
for x ∈ X and r ∈ N and ∈ {<,≤}.
Deﬁnition 2.7 [Semantics of a Timed Automaton] The semantics of a Timed Au-
tomaton A = (L, l0,X,Σ
ε, E, Inv) is a timed transition system SA = (Q, q0,Σ
ε,→)
with Q = L× (R≥0)
X , q0 = (l0,0) is the initial state and → is deﬁned by:
(l, v)
a
−→ (l′, v′) iﬀ Fired(l, γ, a,R, l′) ∈ E s.t.
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
γ(v) = tt,
v′ = v[R → 0]
Inv(l′)(v′) = tt
(l, v)
t
−→ (l′, v′) iﬀ
{
l = l′ v′ = v + t and
∀ 0 ≤ t′ ≤ t, Inv(l)(v + t′) = tt
We denote QA, for the set of states of A. A run ρ of A is an initial run of SA. The
timed language accepted by A is L(A) = L(SA).
State space abstraction
The analysis of a TA is based on the exploration of a ﬁnite graph, the region
graph, where the nodes are symbolic states i.e. an equivalence classes of clock
values. The state space is built by analyzing successors of the initial region (forward
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analysis) [3]. Actually eﬃcient forward (and backward) algorithms using regions do
not code regions but zones, a ﬁnite convex union of regions because regions suﬀer
of a combinatorial explosions and are quite uneasy to manipulate [14].
Constructors
Lets ﬁnally introduce some constructors over Timed Automata in order to ex-
press timed information ﬂow in concurrent timed systems.
To describe a system as a parallel composition of Timed Automata, we use the
classical composition notion based on a synchronization function a` la Arnold-Nivat.
Let X = {x1, · · · , xn} be a set of clocks, A1, . . . , An be n Timed Automata with
Ai = (Ni, li,0,X,Σ, Ei, Invi). A synchronization function f is a partial function
from (Σ ∪ {•})n ↪→ Σ where • is a special symbol used when an automaton is not
involved in a step of the global system. We denote by (A1| . . . |An)f the parallel
composition of the Ai’s w.r.t. f . The conﬁgurations of (A1| . . . |An)f are pairs (l,v)
with l = (l1, . . . , ln) ∈ N1× . . .×Nn and v = (v1, · · · , vn) where each vi is the value
of the clock xi ∈ X.
Deﬁnition 2.8 [Hiding Timed Automata] Let A = (L, l0,X,Σ
ε, E, Inv) be a TA
and Γ ⊆ Σ. We deﬁne the Γ-hiding TA A/Γ = (L, l0,X, (Σ \ Γ)
ε, E/Γ, Inv) (with
hided Γ-transitions) by 〈l, γ, a,R, l′〉 ∈ E/Γ iﬀ (1) a ∈ (Σ \Γ)
ε and 〈l, γ, a,R, l′〉 ∈ E
or (2) a =  and there is a transition 〈l, γ, b,R, l′〉 ∈ E with b ∈ Γ.
Transitions labeled with Γ are replaced by  transitions, simulating so the hiding
of information.
Deﬁnition 2.9 [Restriction Timed Automata] Let A = (L, l0,X,Σ
ε, E, Inv) be a
TA and Γ ⊆ Σ. We deﬁne the Γ-restriction TA A\Γ = (L, l0,X, (Σ \ Γ)
ε, E\Γ, Inv)
(without Γ-transitions) by 〈l, γ, a,R, l′〉 ∈ E\Γ iﬀ a ∈ (Σ\Γ)
ε and 〈l, γ, a,R, l′〉 ∈ E.
All transitions labeled with Γ are cut oﬀ the Timed Automaton.
3 Timed Non Interference for Security Timed Au-
tomata
In this section, we reformulate some non interference properties for information ﬂow
analysis in dense time discrete event systems previously studied in an untimed [9]
or discrete time [17] setting. So we reﬁne the notion of timed non interference
for Timed Automata introduced in [5]. We start with Strong Non-deterministic
Non Interference (SNNI). The basic idea of SNNI is that the public behavior of a
system is not aﬀected by the eﬀects of its private behavior. We deﬁne this property
on diﬀerent behavior notions in section 3.3: trace equivalence, weak cosimulation,
weak bisimulation and reachability equivalence. We then classify these properties
among them and address decidability issues raised by their veriﬁcation. A timed
security model based on Timed Automata is presented in section 3.2.
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s1
s2
s3
l1
h1
l1
s0
s1
s2
s3
x1 ≤ 3 x1 ≤ 3
x1 ≥ 2, l1
x1 ≥ 1, h1
l1
Fig. 1. Non-interfering automaton and interfering Timed Automaton
3.1 An introductory example
Let start by considering informally how information ﬂow prohibition arises in in-
teracting transition systems, taking a simple example. Consider ﬁrst the transition
system depicted on the left-hand side of the Figure 1. Suppose we attach secrecy
levels to each action, for example h1 ∈ Σpriv and l1 ∈ Σpub. Intuitively this means
that we wish interaction at h1 to be secret, while interaction at l1 may be known
by a wider public: any private action may interact at h1 and l1, while a public
action may interact only at l1. None of the public observers i.e. observers allowed
to observe (or react) only the public actions, has the possibility to know whether an
interaction with h1 happened or not. Otherwise stated, no causal dependency from
private behavior may be inferred by any public observer. However adding timing
constraints on this transition system could introduce prohibited information ﬂow
from the private level to the public one. As an illustration suppose that l1 can-
not occurs from s0 before 2 time units as depicted by the Timed Automaton on the
right-hand side of the Figure 1, then any public observer has the possibility to know
whether an interaction with h1 happened or not in the eventuality of l1 occurring
from s2 before 2 time units i.e. there is a correlation between some private behavior
and some public observation.
3.2 A Timed Security Model
We are looking at extended Timed Automata to model processes and computations
of computing entities interacting at diﬀerent trust levels.
Deﬁnition 3.1 [Security Timed Automaton] A Security Timed Automaton is a
Timed Automaton whose the set of visible actions Σ is partitioned in 2 sets Σpub,
Σpriv.
The set Σpriv represents the actions of a high level user to which secrecy can be
attached. Σlow is the set of actions of low level users.
3.3 Timed Information Flow Properties
The introductory example discussed in the section 3.1 motivates the following deﬁ-
nitions.
3.3.1 Timed Strong Non-deterministic Non Interference
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x1 ≤ 3 x1 ≤ 3
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x1 ≤ 3 x1 ≤ 3
x1 ≥ 2, low1
x1 ≥ 2, hi1
low1
low2
Fig. 2. Timed CSNNI : an interfering and a non-interfering TA
SNNI has been ﬁrst proposed by Focardi [9] as a trace-based generalization of
non interference for concurrent systems.
Deﬁnition 3.2 [Timed SNNI] Let A, a Security Timed Automaton. A satisﬁes
timed strong non-deterministic non interference (timed SNNI) if and only if
L(A/Σpriv) = L(A\Σpriv)
This deﬁnition stands that a timed system is timed SNNI iﬀ a low level user
can only observe timed words of A\Σpriv . It is then impossible for a low level user
observing the timed words of the system to deduce information on the high level.
3.3.2 Timed Cosimulation-based SNNI
We now give a weak timed cosimulation non interference deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 3.3 [Timed Cosimulation-based SNNI] Let A, a Security Timed Au-
tomaton. A satisﬁes timed cosimulation non-deterministic non interference (timed
CSNNI) if and only if
S
A/Σpriv W S
A
Consider the Timed Automaton depicted on the right hand side of the Figure 2.
It is easy to see that it is timed CSNNI. Indeed, the capability of a public observer
to interact at low1 is not correlated to the occurrence of hi1 while such a correla-
tion exists for the Timed Automaton depicted on the left hand side. Any public
interaction at low1 for 1 ≤ x1 < 2 is correlated to the occurrence of hi1.
The next result presents a characterization of timed cosimulation non-
deterministic non interference (timed CSNNI) in terms of cosimulation and will
often be used as an alternative to Def. 3.3 in the sequel:
Theorem 3.4 A Security Timed Automaton A satisﬁes timed cosimulation non-
deterministic non interference (timed CSNNI) iﬀ
S
A/Σpriv W S
A\Σpriv (1)
S
A\Σpriv ′W S
A/Σpriv (2)
Proof. Equation 1 is obtained from deﬁnition 3.3: as A/Σpriv is deﬁned over Σpub
we have S
A/Σpriv W S
A ⇔ S
A/Σpriv W S
A\Σpriv . Equation 2 is obtained directly
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x1 ≤ 3 x1 ≤ 3
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x1 ≥ 1, hi1
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l0
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x1 ≤ 3 x1 ≤ 3
x1 ≥ 2, low1
x1 ≥ 2, hi1
low1
Fig. 3. Timed BSNNI : an interfering and a non-interfering TA
from deﬁnitions of Timed Automata, hiding and restriction: for any TA over Σ =
Σpriv ∪ Σpub, we have S
A\Σpriv ′W S
A/Σpriv . Furthermore ′W is not necessarily
equal to −1W . 
3.3.3 Timed Bisimulation-based SNNI
We now give a timed version of the bisimulation-based deﬁnition of strong non-
deterministic non interference proposed in [9]. Actually, any bisimulation-based
information ﬂow property presented in [9] could be recast in a similar manner.
Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 illustrates diﬀerences between CSNNI and BSNNI.
Deﬁnition 3.5 [Timed Bisimulation-based SNNI] Let A, a Security Timed Au-
tomaton. A satisﬁes timed bisimulation-based strong non-deterministic non inter-
ference (timed BSNNI) if and only if
S
A/Σpriv ≈W S
A\Σpriv
The ﬁgure 3 represents an interfering and a non-interfering Timed Automata.
The one at the left hand side is interfering since any low level interaction at low1
for 1 ≤ x1 < 2 is correlated to the occurrence of hi1.
3.3.4 Timed State NNI
In [5], authors propose a decidable notion of timed non deterministic non-
interference based on states. We reformulate it as follows :
Deﬁnition 3.6 [Timed State NNI] Let A be a Security Timed Automaton over Σ
(Σ = Σpub ∪Σpriv). A is said to be Timed State Non Deterministic Non Interfering
(timed StNNI) if and only if:
Q
A/Σpriv = Q
A\Σpriv i.e. QA = Q
A\Σpriv
Let us note that as Q
A\Σpriv ⊆ QA, then timed StNNI is equivalent to Q
A/Σpriv ⊆
Q
A\Σpriv i.e. QA ⊆ Q
A\Σpriv .
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3.4 Ordering relation among properties
Theorem 3.7 (Timed non interference classiﬁcation)
timed-BSNNI ⇒ timed-CSNNI ⇒ timed-SNNI (3)
timed-SNNI ⇒ timed-CSNNI ⇒ timed-BSNNI (4)
Proof. Equation 3 follows directly Remark 2.4.
Concerning the strict implications 4, we present here a counterexample for the
last implication. Let us consider the Timed Automaton depicted on the right hand
side of the Figure 2. It is timed-CSSNI, however is not timed BSNNI since a public
observer after interacting with low1 has now the capability to detect the deadlock
correlated to the occurrence of hi1.

Remark 3.8 There is no ordering between Timed StNNI and any of the previous
non interference deﬁnitions presented here.
Remark 3.9 It can be proved that 0-trace-non-interference introduced in [5] is
equivalent to Timed StNNI.
3.5 Decidability results
Theorem 3.10 (Timed SNNI decidability) Timed SNNI is undecidable.
Proof. We prove that the universality problem for TA can be reduced to a timed
SNNI problem. Let A be a TA over Σ. The Security Timed Automaton Af is
constructed from A by adding a new edge labeled with h ∈ Σ from the initial
locality of A to a new locality u and for each action a ∈ Σ, a loop over u with
label a. We set Σpub = Σ and Σpriv = {h}. Clearly, A accepts universal timed
language iﬀ Af is timed trace non-interfering. As universality problem is known to
be undecidable for TA, it follows that timed SNNI problem is also undecidable. 
Theorem 3.11 (Timed BSNNI, CSNNI and StNNI decidability) timed
BSNNI, timed CSNNI and timed StNNI are decidable.
Proof. Simulation [1] and bisimulation [12] are decidable for TA and then timed
BSNNI and timed CSNNI are decidable. As reachability [3] is decidable for TA,
timed StNNI is also decidable. 
4 Timed Non-Interference Controllability
4.1 Introduction
Recent researches have presented symbolic control synthesis algorithms for Timed
Automata [20,14,2]. The aim of such algorithms is to design an agent (also named
controller or supervisor) that restricts the behavior of the initial system so that
a property of interest is modeled by the controlled system also called closed-loop
system.
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In such frameworks, the set of actions of the model is classically partitioned
into controllable and uncontrollable actions. Controllable actions, corresponding
to system actions, can be disabled, delayed or forced by the controller whereas
uncontrollable actions, denoting actions from environment, cannot be restricted. In
order to address symbolic control synthesis for Security Timed Automata, the set
of actions Σ is here, more or less arbitrarily, partitioned in two sets Σpub, Σpriv.
Σpub is the set of uncontrollable actions and Σpriv is the set of controllable actions.
Actually, the choice for partitioning will depends on what is considered as intruder’s
actions.
We formalize the controller of a Security Timed Automaton in the following
deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 4.1 [Controller] Let A = (L, l0,X,Σ, E, Inv) be a Security Timed Au-
tomaton over Σ (Σ = Σpub ∪ Σpriv). A controller C = (L
C , lC0 ,X,Σ, E
C , InvC)
for A is a Timed Automaton over Σ such that AC = (A|C)fc where AC =
(LC , (l0, l
C
0 ),X,Σ, EC , InvC) with LC ∈ L × L
C and fc is a control synchroniza-
tion function deﬁned by fc(a, a) = a.
The controller must not restrict uncontrollable behavior in the following sense:
Let (lA, lC) a locality of AC,
(i) ∀〈lA, γ, a,R, l
′
A〉 ∈ E s.t. a ∈ Σpub, there is an edge 〈(lA, lC), γ, a,R, (l
′
A, l
′
C)〉 ∈
EC ,
(ii) if 〈(lA, lC), γ, a,R, (l
′
A, l
′
C)〉 ∈ EC with a ∈ Σpriv then InvC(lA, lC) = Inv(lA)
The ﬁrst condition claims that the controller cannot prevent the ﬁring of uncon-
trollable edges. The rationale behind the second condition is the following:
One cannot impose the ﬁring of an uncontrollable transition but on the other
hand if from a state, it is possible to ﬁre both an uncontrollable transition and a
controllable transition, then one can force the ﬁring of the controllable transition
by a temporal constraint as long as the uncontrollable transition is not ﬁred.
In the timed framework, the cornerstone to solutions of control problems is the
controllable predecessors operator denoted π(X) [14,2,19].
Deﬁnition 4.2 [Controllable predecessors] Let X ⊆ Q be a set of states of a Se-
curity Timed Automaton S. The set of controllable predecessors of X is deﬁned
by:
π(X) = {q ∈ Q | ((∃δ ∈ IR≥0 ∃a ∈ Σ ∃q
′ ∈ X, q
δ
−→
a
−→ q′)
∨ (∃δ ∈ IR≥0 ∃q
′ ∈ X, q
δ
−→ q′))
∧ ∀δu ∈ IR≥0 if ∃au ∈ Σlow, q
′
u ∈ X, q
δu−→
au−→ q′u
then ∃δc < δu ac ∈ Σpriv,∃q
′
c ∈ X q
δc−→
ac−→ q′c}
Informally, q is a controllable predecessor of X iﬀ:
• a state q′ of X is reachable by time elapsing and ﬁring of a transition,
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• for any uncontrollable transition diverging from X, the controller can take a
decision at an earlier date to constraint the system in X.
4.2 Timed Non-interference control problems
In this section we deﬁne and propose solutions for some timed non-interference
control problem. We prove the decidability of control problems of timed-StNNI
and timed-CSNNI by giving algorithms for the synthesis of controller guaranteeing
these two properties. As well as the safety control problem for Timed Automata,
the TTS solution given by the algorithm can be both interpreted as the system in
closed-loop and the controller. For all these problems, the controller that forbids
any controllable actions is a solution but not necessarily the most permissive.
4.2.1 Timed-StNNI Control Problem
First, we consider the Timed State Non-Interference Control Problem.
Deﬁnition 4.3 [Timed-StNNI Control Problem] Let A be a Security Timed Au-
tomaton over Σ (Σ = Σpub ∪ Σpriv). A StNNI controller C for A (according to
def. 4.1) is a Timed Automaton over Σ such that :
Q
((A|C)fc )/Σpriv = Q
((A|C)fc )\Σpriv
i.e. Q(A|C)fc = Q
((A|C)fc )\Σpriv
Let us consider the solution of the safety control problem on A that is to ﬁnd a
controller C such that Q(A|C)fc ⊆ Q
A\Σpriv .
Proposition 4.4 If C is the solution of the control problem Q(A|C)fc ⊆ Q
A\Σpriv ,
C is a solution of timed-StNNI if and only if:
∀q ∈ Q(A|C)fc∃ρ = τ1 · low1 . . . τn · lown ∈ S
(A|C)fc , lowi ∈ Σpub such that q0
ρ
−→ q
Proof. Let C the solution of the safety control problem Q(A|C)fc ⊆ Q
A\Σpriv .
If C is the solution of the timed-StNNI problem then Q(A|C)fc ⊆ Q
((A|C)fc )\Σpriv .
Since the property holds for all states of Q
((A|C)fc )\Σpriv , it also holds for any state
of Q(A|C)fc .
The converse is straightforward. 
This characterization gives rise to a decision procedure for the timed-StNNI
control problem:
Theorem 4.5 (Timed-StNNI Control Problem Decidability) The timed-
StNNI control problem is decidable and there exists a state-based controller C such
that (A|C)fc is timed-StNNI.
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Proof. The main idea is to use a classical controllable predecessors algorithm ex-
tended with a step that ensures that all states computed are reachable from the ini-
tial states by a sequence of low level actions (Σpub), that is states of ((A|C)fc)\Σpriv .
Since the controller can restrict the behaviors of the system, this step ensures that
computed states belong to the set of states of ((A|C)fc)\Σpriv .
In order to detail, let us consider the region graph of A, R∗ [3].
R∗ has a ﬁnite number of regions.The iterative process given by X0 = Q
A\Σpriv
and Xi+1 = Xi ∩ π(Xi) ∩
−−−−−−→
PostΣpub
∗(π(Xi)) will converge after ﬁnitely many steps
for TA. Let the greatest ﬁxed point obtained be denoted by X∗.
The TTS induced by X∗ on A is timed-StNNI.
It is straightforward that ∀iXi ⊆ Q
A\Σpriv and that the TTS veriﬁes the condi-
tion of the proposition 4.4

4.2.2 Timed-CSNNI Control Problem
In this section, we will prove that timed-CSNNI is decidable and a controller
is computable. Intuitively, the computation method we propose consists ﬁrst in
computing the (controllable as well as uncontrollable) non interfering behavior of
the STA A that is to say the intersection of behavior of A with the behavior of
A\Σpriv given by the product (A|A\Σpriv)f synchronized on actions of Σpub and free
on actions of Σpriv. The controllable behavior guaranteeing the non-interference
property is then extracted from this result.
Deﬁnition 4.6 [Timed-CSNNI Control Problem] Let A be a Security Timed Au-
tomaton over Σ = Σpub ∪Σpriv. A CSSNI controller C for A (according to def. 4.1)
is a timed automaton over Σ such that:
S
(A|C)/Σpriv W S
(A|C)\Σpriv
Let us now deﬁne the simulation relation we will use to prove that the timed-
CSNNI problem is decidable :
Deﬁnition 4.7 [Simulation relation] Let q = (l1, l2, v) ∈ Q
(A|C)/Σpriv and q′ =
(l′1, l
′
2, v
′) ∈ Q
(A|C)\Σpriv : q  q′ ⇔ l2 = l
′
2 ∧ v = v
′
Since S
(A|C)\Σpriv  S
A\Σpriv (the controller restrict the behavior of A), we will
also note q  q′ for any q = (l1, l2, v) ∈ Q
(A|C)\Σpriv and q′ = (l′2, v
′) ∈ Q
A\Σpriv if
and only if l2 = l
′
2 and v = v
′.
Deﬁnition 4.8 [Unfolding of A over (A|A\Σpriv)f ] Let A = (L, 0,X,Σ, E, Inv) be
a TA over Σ = Σpub∪Σpriv. Let A
′ = (L′, (l′0, l
′
0),X,Σ, E
′, Inv′)) with L′ ∈ L×L be
a TA deﬁned by A′ = (A|A\Σpriv)f where f(a, •) = a, if a ∈ Σpriv and f(a, a) = a
a ∈ Σpub.
The TA A′′ = (L′′, (l0, l0),X,Σ, E
′′, Inv′′) with L′′ ∈ (L × L) ∪ {bad} is the
unfolding of A over A′ iﬀ :
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l0
l1
l2
x ≤ 3
x ≥ 0, h
x ≥ 2, low
x ≥ 1, low
x ≥ 0, hi
low
l0 l2
x ≤ 3
x ≥ 2, low
low
Fig. 4. A and A\Σpriv
(i) L′′ = L′ ∪ {bad}
(ii) ∀e′ = 〈(li, lj), γ
′, a,R′, (l′i, l
′
j)〉 ∈ E
′ such that e = 〈li, γ, a,R, l
′
i〉 ∈ E
we have 〈(li, lj), γ, a,R, (l
′
i, l
′
j)〉 ∈ E
′′,
(iii) ∀e = 〈l, γ, a,R, l′〉 ∈ E such that a ∈ Σpub, ∀(l, li) ∈ L
′ and (l′, lj) ∈ L
′
we have 〈(l, li), γ, a,R, (l
′, lj)〉 ∈ E
′′,
(iv) ∀e = 〈l, γ, a,R, l′〉 ∈ E such that a ∈ Σpub, ∀(l, li) ∈ L
′ and (l′, lj) ∈ L
′
we have 〈(l, li), γ, a,R, (bad)〉 ∈ E
′′,
(v) ∀l = (li, lj) ∈ L
′′, Inv(l) = Inv(li)
The second and the ﬁfth requirements relax the constraints inherited from
A\Σpriv . The third and the fourth requirements add edges over public actions re-
moved by (A|A\Σpriv)f . We use the location bad as destination of edges leading to
location not in L′.
Remark 4.9 A′ is easily seen to be Timed-CSNNI (see ﬁgure 5). By synchronizing
A with A\Σpriv , we isolate all non-interfering behaviors of A. We will then use A
′
to compute a controller for A.
Remark 4.10 Unfolding of A over A′ has the same discrete structure as A′ but
extended with the behavior ofA. This Timed Automaton will be then used to isolate
states that are timed-CSNNI and compute the controller ensuring the timed-CSNNI
property.
Deﬁnition 4.11 [States of A′′ similar to states of A\Σpriv ] Let us consider the
Timed Automaton A′′ and the set of states of A′: QA
′
⊆ QA
′′
. We note SiSt(A′)
the set of states deﬁned by:
SiSt(A′) = {q ∈ QA
′
| if ∃low ∈ Σpub st. q
low
−−→∈ E′′
then ∃q′ ∈ Q
A\Σpriv st. q  q′ ∧ q′
low
−−→∈ E
A\Σpriv }
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l0l0
l1l2
l2l2
l1l0
x ≤ 3
x ≤ 3
x ≥ 0, h
x ≥ 2, low
x ≥ 2,
low
x ≥ 1,
low
x ≥ 0,
hi
low
l0l0
l1l2
l2l2
l1l0
x ≤ 3
x ≤ 3
x ≥ 0, h
x ≥ 2, low
x ≥ 2,
low
x ≥ 1,
low
x ≥ 0,
hi
low
Fig. 5. A′ = (A|A\Σpriv )f and A
′′
SiSt(A′) contains all states that are weakly similar to a state of A\Σpriv . That
is, for every state q = (l1, l2, v) such that the transition low is possible in the TTS
deﬁned by A′′, there exists also such a transition (l2, v)
low
−−→ in the TTS deﬁned by
A\Σpriv . Considering the example of the ﬁgure 5, (l1, l0, x = 1) ∈ SiSt(A
′) since
(l0, x = 1) 
low
−−→ for A\Σpriv .
The sketch of the method to ﬁnd a controller is then the following:
(i) Compute A′ (This is timed-CSSNI) and the unfolding A′′ of A.
(ii) Compute the largest controllable subset of SiSt(A′)) preserving the timed-
CSNNI property, that is states of S
(A|C)/Σpriv weakly timed similar to a state
of S
(A|C)\Σpriv . Informally, at each iteration, a set of controllable safe states is
computed and then reﬁned to match the timed-CSNNI property.
More in detail, let us consider the algorithm 1 where R\Σpriv(X) = {q ∈
X | ∃q0 ∈ Q0,∃(τi) ∈ (R≥0)
n, ∃(lowi) ∈ (Σpub)
n, q0
τ1−→ q1
low1−−−→ q′1 · · ·
lown−−−→
q′n = q ∧ ∀i, qi, q
′
i ∈ X} is the set of states that are reachable only by elaps-
ing of time or low level actions (Σpub) such that all intermediary states remain
in X, PredΣ∗priv(X) = {q ∈ Q |∃q
′ ∈ X,∃ρ ∈ Σ∗priv q
ρ
−→ q′} is the set
of predecessors of X by a sequence of discrete controllable transitions (Σpriv),
Predlow(X) = {q ∈ Q |∃q
′ ∈ X q
low
−−→ q′, low ∈ Σpub}, is the set of discrete
predecessors of X by an uncontrollable transition, PredYΣpriv(X) = {q ∈ Y | q
hi1−−→
q1
hi2−−→ q2 . . .
hn−→ qn ∧ q, q1, . . . qn−1 ∈ Y, qn ∈ Y ∧ ∀i, hii ∈ Σpriv} is the set of
predecessors of X by a sequence of discrete controllable transitions such that all
intermediary states remain in Y , π(X) is the classical controllable predecessor op-
erator and Sim(X,Y ) = {q ∈ X | ∃q′ ∈ Y q  q′} is the set of states X similar to
Y .
Algorithm 1 (Alg) We note Alg the following ﬁx-point algo-
rithm:
1: X0 ← SiSt(A
′)
2: repeat
3: Xi+1 ← π(Xi)
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4: Xi+1 ← Sim(Xi+1, R\Σpriv (Xi+1))
5: for all l ∈ Σpub do
6: Y ← PredΣ∗priv (Predlow(Xi+1))
7: Z ← Pred
Xi+1
Σ∗priv
(Pred
Xi+1
low (Xi+1))
8: X ′ ← Xi+1 \ (Z \ Y )
9: until X ′ = Xi
Proposition 4.12 If Alg converges, we note X∗ the solution. The TTS induced
by X∗ on SA′′ is CSNNI.
Proof. We have to prove that (SX
∗
A′′ )/Σpriv W (S
X∗
A′′ )\Σpriv .
Let q ∈ QS
X∗
A′′ . According to line 4 of the algorithm, ∃q′ ∈ Q
SX
∗
A′′ \Σpriv such that
q  q′. It there exists a ﬁring sequence q
hi1...hin−−−−−→ s
low1−−−→ r then q  s (and so
q′  s) and ∃r′ ∈ Q
SX
∗
A′′ \Σpriv such that r  r′ (line 4). We also have with lines
5–8, s, r ∈ X∗. Since s
low1−−−→ r and q′  s, q′
low1−−−→ r′. So q′
low1−−−→ r′ and r  r′.
Consequently, q and q′ fulﬁll the weak timed simulation (by replacing all hii by ).
The proof would be similar for continuous transitions. 
Proposition 4.13 The algorithm Alg terminates.
Proof. The convergence of the algorithm is ensured by the region graph R∗ [3]:
the family sequence (Xi) is monotone (Xi+1 ⊆ Xi) over a ﬁnite domain R
∗. 
As a corollary of propositions 4.12 and 4.13, we get the following result:
Theorem 4.14 (Timed-CSNNI Control Problem Decidability) Timed-
CSNNI is decidable and a controller is computable.
Indeed, since the synchronization function (fc) is total, the TTS solution given by
the algorithm can be both interpreted as the system in closed-loop and the controller
for the system (as for safety control problem on TA). The complete method is
illustrated on a simple example in the next section.
5 CSNNI Control Problem - A simple example
Let us consider the Security Timed Automaton A of ﬁgure 6 and the CSNNI control
problem on A.
Following the method proposed in section 4.2.2, we compute A′ = (A|C)fc . A
′
is represented in ﬁgure 7. We are then able to compute QA
′
(table 1).
Given QA
′
and A′′ we can then compute SiSt(A′)(table 2). For instance, at
state (l2, l0, x1 = 1) the ﬁring of low1 is possible for A
′′ while it is not possible
for the state (l0, x1 = 1) in A
′. So this state must be discarded. The aim of the
controller will be to prevent this state to be reachable.
The solution of the algorithm 1 is the set of states of table 3 which can be
transformed into the Timed Automaton of the ﬁgure 9.
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Localities Clock Space
l0l0 x1 ≤ 3
l1l1 x1 ≥ 2
l4l4 x1 ≥ 2
l2l0 1 ≤ x1 ≤ 3
l3l1 2 ≤ x1
l5l1 1 ≤ x1
Table 1
QA
′
Localities Clock Space
l0l0 x1 ≤ 3
l1l1 x1 ≥ 2
l4l4 x1 ≥ 2
l2l0 2 ≤ x1 ≤ 3
l3l1 1 ≤ x1
l5l1 1 ≤ x1
bad ∅
Table 2
SiSt(A′)
Localities Clock Space
l0l0 x1 ≤ 3
l1l1 x1 ≥ 2
l4l4 x1 ≥ 2
l2l0 2 ≤ x1 ≤ 3
l3l1 2 ≤ x1
l5l1 ∅
bad ∅
Table 3
Solution of control algorithm 1
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l0
l1 l4
l2
l3 l5 l6
x1 ≤ 3 x1 ≤ 3
x1 ≥ 2, low1
x1 ≥ 1, hi1
low1
low2 hi2 low3
l0
l1 l4
x1 ≤ 3
x1 ≥ 2, low1
low2
Fig. 6. Control example :A and A\Σpriv
l0l0
l1l1 l4l4
l2l0
l3l1 l5l1
x1 ≤ 3 x1 ≤ 3
x1 ≥ 2, low1
x1 ≥ 1, hi1
x1 ≥ 2, low1
low2 hi2
Fig. 7. Control example : A′
l0l0
l1l1 l4l4
l2l0
l3l1 l5l1 bad
x1 ≤ 3 x1 ≤ 3
x1 ≥ 2, low1
x1 ≥ 1, hi1
low1
low2 hi2 low3
Fig. 8. Control example : A′′
l0l0
l1l1 l4l4
l2l0
l3l1 l5l1
x1 ≤ 3 x1 ≤ 3
x1 ≥ 2, low1
x1 ≥ 2, hi1
low1
low2 false, hi2
Fig. 9. Solution of the CSNNI control problem on A
6 Conclusion and future work
In this paper we have reformulated SNNI in dense time setting for four semantics of
Security Timed Automata and addressed the decidability issues of their associate
veriﬁcation problem. We have also addressed, for the ﬁrst time, the control syn-
thesis problem for Timed CSNNI and Timed StSNNI and, in each case, provided
algorithms computing an associated controller.
In the following we would like to highlight four speciﬁc aspects we intend to
focus our attention on, in view of further developments: Timed BSNNI controller,
veriﬁcation and controller synthesis for Timed BNDC, timed control with partial
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observability and Timed Intransitive Non Interference.
Control synthesis techniques for Timed BSNNI. Of course it remains to
extend control synthesis to Timed BSNNI to complete the picture depicted in this
paper.
Proof and control synthesis techniques for Timed BNDC. In [9] it is pro-
posed Bisimulation-based nondeducibility on Composition (BNDC) as the most nat-
ural untimed information ﬂow property: a system S satisﬁes BNDC if for any private
level user Π, the public behavior of S is not aﬀected by its interaction with Π. A
next issue is the extension to a dense time reformulation of BNDC in our theory
together with related proof and control synthesis techniques.
Timed non interference control synthesis with partial observability. De-
pending on the nature of the plant, the non-controllable actions could be observable
(full observability) or only a proper subset (partial observability) may be observable
by the controller. In the timed setting, partial observability assumption applies not
only to uncontrollable actions but also to the clocks of the security system.
Timed intransitive non interference control synthesis. Non interference en-
sures absence of information ﬂow. But absence of information ﬂow is rarely very
interesting as a description of conﬁdentiality, as many practical applications are
intended to preserve conﬁdentiality, but nonetheless leak information. Also, an-
other important issue is the extension to dense time reformulation of Intransitive
Non Interference (INI). This term refers to information ﬂow properties required
of systems like downgraders in which it may be legitimate for information to ﬂow
indirectly between two users but not directly. A clever and complete development
of INI can be found in [18]. It is formulated in terms of purging and based on
Moore and Mealy machines. Purging involves applying a function to the history
of the system up to which removes all those parts that should not inﬂuence what
a given agent sees. This purge-based deﬁnition of INI has been also characterized
in [11] in terms of observability in the context of Discrete Event Systems (DES) as
introduced by Lin and Wonham [13]. Recently Hadj-Alouane, Lin and Yeddes [10]
in a personal communication presented a preliminary work in view of an extension
of this purge-based deﬁnition of INI to dense time in the context of Timed Au-
tomata and it has to be stressed that nor decidability of Timed INI or Timed INI
control synthesis are addressed in this draft. Moreover all the approaches to INI
mentioned above are limited to deterministic systems and thus are not applicable
to distributed systems. However nondeterministic generalizations for untimed INI
have been proposed in [16,15,4,6].
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